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PRACTICAL LEGAL STUDIES AND CRITICAL 
LEGAL STUDIES 
Jay M. Feinman* 
Richard Posner's recent article entitled The Jurisprudence of Skep-
ticism 1 highlights a new wave of legal scholarship. Every intellectual 
movement needs a name; because of the new wave's use of "practical 
reason"2 and because of its odd link with Critical Legal Studies,3 I 
suggest that this scholarly movement may now formally be called the 
Practical Legal Studies (PLS) movement. Practical Legal Studies ex-
pressly abandons the goals of certainty, formal accuracy, and formal 
legitimacy in legal decisionmaking in favor of more fluid techniques of 
reasoning and argumentation. Because the PLS movement has now 
achieved such stature, it is time to begin the inevitable process of ana-
lyzing the movement's philosophy, its place in American jurispru-
dence, and the motivations and attitudes of its adherents - the same 
process to which Critical Legal Studies has been subject.4 As Posner 
says, it also is important to distinguish this approach from "radical 
skeptics in the critical legal studies movement" (p. 829). While there 
are differences within PLS (pp. 837-38, 847-48, 887-88), it is appropri-
ate to begin with Posner, a dominant figure in any enterprise that he 
undertakes. 5 
The basic questions that Practical Legal Studies confronts are how 
judges decide cases and how judges should decide cases. 6 The tradi-
tional analytic response to these questions has been that judges apply 
formal methods of legal reasoning, and the formal methods sufficiently 
comport with the courts' role in the political structure to provide legit-
imacy. That response has been untenable for a generation or more; 
* Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law, Camden, N.J.- Ed. My thanks to Rudy Pcritz 
for his comments. 
1. 86 MICH. L. REV. 827 (1988). All subsequent references will be enclosed in parentheses in 
the text. 
2. See infra text following note 8. 
3. See infra text accompanying notes 21-27. 
4. See, e.g., Symposium on Critical Legal Studies, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 691 {1985); Critical 
Legal Studies Symposium, 36 STAN. L. REV. I (1984). 
5. Posner's article and the other PLS literature deal with a number of related issues; this 
comment addresses only the question of judicial decisionmaking. 
6. For a useful introduction,' see Wellman, Practical Reasoning and Judicial Justification: 
Toward an Adequate Theory, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 45 (1985). 
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thus PLS has moved to informal legal reasoning as a description of 
adjudication and as a source of legitimacy. 
Posner presents a two-part response to the questions. First, judges 
can relatively easily arrive at the correct decision in many cases by 
applying either some form of "exact inquiry" or of "practical reason." 
Second, some indeterminate cases remain in which the correct result is 
unavailable through these methods; the judge's job in those cases is to 
apply policy analysis to reach results which are reasonable, if not de-
monstrably correct. 
The techniques by which most legal disputes are solved are exact 
inquiry and practical reason. Exact inquiry includes the methods tra-
ditionally associated with formal reasoning, particularly syllogistic 
and enthymematic logic and scientific observation. Courts use less rig-
orous versions of these methods than logicians do, but the methods as 
applied are adequate to solve many cases. For example, where an ap-
plicable rule, its validity, and the facts to which it is to be applied are 
clear, logic (or something that resembles it) is enough for the court to 
reach a correct result. 
In other cases practical reason is required. Practical reason is de-
fined as "the methods that people who are not credulous - who have 
inquiring minds - use to form beliefs about matters that cannot be 
verified by logic or exact observation" (p. 838). The "grab bag" of 
methods of investigation and persuasion includes anecdote, introspec-
tion, common sense, intuition, and - especially relevant to law -
authority, reasoning by analogy, interpretation, means-end rationality, 
tacit knowledge, and the test of time. "Miscellaneous and unrigorous 
it may be, but practical reason is our principal set of tools for answer-
ing questions large and small" (pp. 838-39). In law, practical reason is 
usually adequate to achieve a high degree of certainty about the cor-
rect results in cases. 
However, some difficult and controversial cases defy resolution 
even by practical reason. In these cases, there is no distinctive form of 
legal reasoning available, and the judge must apply policy analysis, 
which Posner presents as a four-step process. First, the judge draws 
from all available data a concept of the relevant field of law. The data 
useful for this purpose include legal texts such as cases and legislative 
history, the characteristics of legal institutions, and, "lacking definitive 
guidance from these sources, ... a social vision as well" (p. 863). Sec-
ond, the judge canvasses the pertinent precedents and other sources, 
legal and nonlegal, for information that may help decide the case. 
Third, based on this information, the judge makes a policy judgment 
about the applicability of the concept to the present case. Finally, he 
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returns to the precedents to assure that the policy judgment is reason-
ably consistent with them. 
Posner states that this approach describes "the actual (though 
often implicit) reasoning process that good judges use in the tough 
cases" (p. 863). Depending on the "social vision" and "the policy 
judgments, political preferences, and ethical values of the judges" (p. 
828) in the particular case, more than one result "would be equally 
likely to be pronounced correct by an informed, impartial observer" 
(p. 828). In the difficult case, therefore, the judge's goal cannot be to 
reach a right result but only a reasonable one. 
Thus, in Posner's view there are easy cases and hard cases, each 
amenable to treatment by different, equally legitimate methods. A 
common thread runs through the discussion of the different methods, 
however. Some easy cases can be solved syllogistically because the 
meaning, the applicability, and the validity of a doctrine are "clear" 
(p. 890). Other cases are solved through "practical" reasoning. And 
hard cases can still yield "reasonable" results through the application 
of policy analysis. The common thread is that each of these terms -
clear, practical, reasonable - invokes a dominant political ideology as 
a basis for the methods of reasoning and their legitimacy. 
The point can be made by considering the meaning of "practical" 
reason. Practical reason as a mode of thinking and rhetoric has an 
ancient lineage, but its modern uses in law are somewhat removed 
from that tradition. 7 Practical reason today encompasses a variety of 
everyday techniques of thinking. But what distinguishes a method of 
practical reason from ·what might be called "impractical irreason"? 
Why is means-tmd rationality useful in deciding a case while reading 
the entrails of a goat or trial by ordeal is not? The distinguishing fea-
ture, of course, is our society's judgment about the utility and rational-
ity of the former methods, and the uselessness and irrationality of the 
latter. That judgment is based on beliefs about human rationality and 
the inaccessibility of divine guidance. In short, societal conventions 
establish what is "practical," just as they establish what is "clear" or 
"reasonable. "8 
Focusing on social conventions suggests that Posner's use of "prac-
tical" in the phrase "practical reason" resonates with many familiar, 
7. Practical reason is a faculty defined within the Aristotelian tradition. As Mark Tushnet 
points out, however, the social preconditions for an Aristotelian exercise of practical reason are 
unavailable to us. Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. L. REV. 
1502, 1534-36 (1985). 
8. Posner distinguishes himself from the scholars he calls the new conventionalists, but the 
distinction appears to turn on the extent of the commitment to conventions as the source of 
reason; all PLS scholars place considerable reliance on convention. 
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nontechnical uses of the term. For example, CLS scholars are not be-
ing "practical" when they suggest utopian reorganizations of law 
school or radical transformations of doctrine, or when they criticize 
law and legal thought without immediately proposing an alternative. 
In public life, it is not "practical" to vote for Jesse Jackson (or Eugene 
McCarthy, or Pat Robertson) for president, because a Black (or peace 
candidate, or fundamentalist Christian) "can't" win. And it's not 
"practical" to divest of investments in South Africa, or to engage in 
civil disobedience to achieve desegregation in the South, or to cease 
the deployment of nuclear weapons unilaterally, and so on. 
What "practical" means, in general, is that the view espoused con-
forms to the prevailing political ideology. In all of these particular 
contexts, to be "practical" means that any action proposed or taken 
must conform to the currently dominant ideology that frames the is-
sues, and that any view that lies outside the political mainstream is by 
definition not "practical." Thus, any action within the political main-
stream is "reasonable"; while "reasonable people can differ" about 
judgments within the mainstream, it is "unreasonable" to be outside 
the mainstream. Further, "unreasonable" is often used synonymously 
with a pejorative sense of the term "political." This explains how Pos-
ner can acknowledge that judges must use their political preferences in 
making some decisions (p. 828), while denying that most decisions -
those arrived at through practical reason - are "political" (p. 840). 9 
Of course, a dominant ideology is neither unitary nor capable of 
precise definition, and subscribing to the ideology does not mean sup-
porting "the status quo" in a crude sense. 10 Moreover, in particular 
areas of endeavor, such as legal discourse, the ideology takes distinc-
tive forms. One branch of PLS focuses on "the special traditions of 
the legal profession" as a source of conventional understanding (pp. 
886-87), but "conventional understanding" is simply another way of 
describing ideology. 
The inability to delineate the ideology precisely does not deny its 
existence or its impact. 11 The ideology can be evoked by familiar 
catch-phrases:12 an economy of regulated capitalism; a democratic, 
9. The same association of unreasonableness and politics appears in academics when leftist 
tenure candidates can be criticized either for being "political" or on a "nonpolitical" scholarly 
basis, while their critics remain "reasonable" and "nonpolitical." See Frug, McCarthyism and 
Critical Legal Studies, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 665 (1987). 
10. Accordingly, Practical scholars of various political stripes can comfortably fit within the 
movement. See infra text accompanying notes 21-24. 
11. Posner might suggest that knowledge of the ideology is available through the exercise of 
practical reason. 
12. Because PLS is, as Posner says, "skeptical," all of these terms should be qualified by the 
term "relatively." 
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pluralist polity; a meritocratic yet egalitarian social order; an autono-
mous, functional legal process; and a unitary but hierarchical bar. 
The dominant ideology also has implicit personal characteristics: 
white, male, elite, and rational. The concept of "different voices" is by 
now familiar in legal scholarship13 (though not universally accepted by 
any means), and this dominant ideology is a voice which permeates 
the PLS literature.14 A particularly telling instance of this is the image 
Posner presents of the practical, skeptical judge. His model judge de-
liberates on issues using the best tools available, imperfect though they 
may be; in the most controversial cases, the judge coolly applies Pos-
ner's four-step policy analysis. We have seen this skeptical judge, this 
deliberative decisionmaker, somewhere before. He is, I suggest, a 
close relative of the rational calculator who is the personification of 
the economic analysis of law. The skeptical judge has the same quali-
ties of careful calculation and knowledge of self and situation that 
characterize economic man. 
Much of the source of power in the dominant ideology is revealed 
by this type of personification. The skeptical judge and the sources on 
which he draws are presented as entities that exist in the world. Who 
can dispute the authority of the deliberative, skeptical judge? How 
can we disagree with the "reasonableness" of a decision as assessed by 
"an informed, impartial observer" (p. 88)? Indeed, what alternative is 
there to being "practical"? 
Unfortunately, all of this is reification. What is "practical" is a 
political choice, but a choice that is hidden behind seemingly neutral 
terms, concepts, and images. Thus, PLS scholars may argue that there 
simply is no alternative to the reliance on convention and the use of 
the techniques Posner outlines. That narrow vision, however, is sim-
ply a consequence of the focus on supporting established institutions 
of power. In fact, it is entirely possible for judges to be impractical, or 
Critical - that is, to confront the dominant ideology - and not just 
skeptical. 
When stated at a general level, the process of Critical legal deci-
sionmaking is not easy to distinguish from Practical legal decision-
making. Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey define some fundamental 
characteristics of PLS as 
a concern for history and context; a desire to avoid abstracting away the 
human component in judicial decisionmaking; an appreciation of the 
13. See West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988); Matsuda, Looking to 
the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987). 
14. The Critical literature is not immune, either. See Symposium, Minority Critiques of tire 
Critical Legal Studies Movemellt, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297 (1987). 
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complexity of life;" some faith in dialogue and deliberation; a. tolerance 
for ambiguity, accommodation, and tentativeness, but a skepticism of 
rigid dichotomies; and an overall humility.15 
Many Critical scholars would accept the same characteristics, 
although their content might vary. "A concern for history and con-
text" might simply mean complexity to a Practical scholar, where it 
suggests dialectical materialism16 or Foucaultian genealogy17 to a Crit-
ical scholar. "Skepticism of rigid dichotomies" may mean Posnerian 
skepticism about intangible concepts or it may mean critical decon-
struction.18 "The human component in deCisionmaking" could be 
Realist recognition of the individuality of the judge or a phenomeno-
logical analysis stressing the power of preconscious social 
conventions. 19 
Thus, there are disciplinary differences between practical and im-
practical approaches, but the real key may be the singer, not the song. 
What is required for Critical judging (and Critical scholarship) is to be 
"unreasonable" with precisely the connotation that term c;arries in 
Posner's usage: to proceed from a radically different political perspec-
tive, with a sense that legal conventions are problematic. Any general 
description of methodology will fail to capture this essential distinc-
tion, which can only be apprehended by the exercise, not of practical 
reason, but of one's sense of personal and political connection with 
like-minded others. This faculty is something akin to elements of Pos-
ner's grab-bag of practical reason - anecdote, intuition, empathy -
but, as with the larger issue, the description of the process fails to 
capture our experience of it. 20 
The fundamental political difference between CLS and PLS, like 
the broad and potent definitions of such terms as "reasonable," "prac-
tical," and "political," explains the wide range of political and intellec-
tual beliefs represented in the Practical Legal Studies movement. 
15. Farber & Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 
1646 (1987), quoted i11 Posner, supra note 1, at 887. Posner criticizes this description as too ad 
hoc and discretionary. Id. 
16. See, e.g., Holt, Recovery by the Worker Who Quits: A Comparison of the Mainstream, 
Legal Realist, and Critical Legal Studies Approaches to a Problem of Nineteenth Century Contract 
Law, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 677. . 
17. See, e.g., Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 
133 U. PA. L. REV. 685 (1985). 
18. See Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987). 
19. See, e.g., Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning, 3 RES. L. & Soc. 25 (1980). 
20. For examples of the critical alternative to reasonableness, see Feinman, A Case Study in 
Crirical Comract Law, 1987 ANN. SURV. AM. L. (forthcoming); Kennedy, Freedom and Con-
slrailll in Adjudication: A Crilical Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL Eouc. 518 (1986); Singer, The 
Reliance [/llerest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988); R. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL 
STUDIES MOVEMENT 43-90 (1986). 
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Many PLS scholars defy characterization as liberal or conservative; a 
representative list includes such diverse figures as Anthony 
Kronman,21 Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey,22 Steve Shiffrin,23 Cass 
Sunstein,24 and Posner. It would be banal to state that all of these 
scholars share a commitment to the prevailing legal and political or-
der, more or less; most legal scholars, including some Critical scholars, 
could be described in that way. More to the point, all of these scholars 
lack an association with an extensive critique of the prevailing legal 
and political order - that is, with the Critical Legal Studies 
movement. 
Accordingly, we can situate the rise of Practical Legal Studies 
within the historical development of American jurisprudence. In The 
Jurisprudence of Skepticism, Posner suggests that lawyers ought to do 
away with inchoate and unverifiable concepts such as intent and sim-
ply focus on observable behavior (pp. 866-71). Pursuing that thought, 
we need not impute to PLS scholars the conscious motive of con-
fronting CLS. Instead, two interlocking behavioral explanations ac-
count for the rise of Practical Legal Studies. An observation of human 
behavior is that people respond, often dramatically, when the ideas 
that give meaning to their lives are threatened. Critical Legal Studies 
challenges many of the things that constitute the psychological and 
professional identity of legal academics, so their response is under-
standable. While CLS has been scorned and derided, at least within 
the legal academy it has had a profoundly disquieting impact in under-
mining the accepted modes of legal discourse. One response has been 
simply to attempt to remove the critics.25 For more thoughtful and 
committed scholars, a different response has been to build an intellec-
tual defense. The defense could not rest on some archaic formalism, 
so PLS scholars have attempted to erect new fortifications to the 
citadel. 
From a historical perspective, the PLS response to the CLS chal-
lenge follows a familiar pattern of radical challenge and traditionalist 
response in American legal thought, as in other branches of intellec-
21. Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 835 (1987); Kronman, Alexander 
Bicke/'s Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567 (1985). 
22. Farber & Frickey, supra note 15, at 1615; Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public 
Choice, 65 TEXAS L. REV. 873 (1987). A useful bibliography of some of the PLS literature is 
provided in Farber & Frickey, supra note 15, at 1645 n.129. 
23. Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory 
of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1212 (1983); Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism, and 
Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REV. I 103 (1983). 
24. Sunstein, Legal Interferences with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129 (1986); 
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985). 
25. See Frug, supra note 9. 
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tual life. The Legal Realists provoked a response from natural law 
theorists and process jurisprudence, 26 for example, and now the pat-
tern repeats itself. 
Thus PLS in all its forms can be viewed as a liberal/moderate/ 
conservative response to the radicalism of Critical Legal Studies. 
However, this line of thought should not be taken too seriously. Criti-
cal legal history is not limited to simple behavioral accounts. Instead, 
a common critical account involves complex economic, social, and 
psychological webs out of which historical actors attempt to find 
meaning. 27 From this perspective, Practical Legal Studies is more 
than a simple response to Critical Legal Studies; it is an attempt by 
many legal intellectuals to find their place in the modern world. 
In this respect it is interesting to return to Posner himself. Because 
of Posner's association with (or dominance of) law and economics, in 
some circles "Posnerian" has been a pejorative adjective connoting 
great intellect, narrowly focused. His more· recent scholarship shatters 
that perception. The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, added to his other 
recent contributions to diverse fields,28 assures recognition of Posner's 
wide-ranging and creative scholarship. The problems facing modern 
legal intellectuals defy solution on traditional grounds, and law and 
economics is clearly too confining a tradition for Posner. The further 
step that needs to be taken is to recognize, as well, the confinement 
imposed by Practical Legal Studies' association with the dominant tra-
dition in politics. 
26. See G. WHITE, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and 
Social Change, in PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 136 (1978). 
27. The basic account is Gordon, Critical L.egal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984). See 
also Holt, supra note 16. For an unusual example, see Feinman, The Meaning of Reliance: A 
Historical Perspective, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 1373. 
28. E._g., R. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988). 
